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This paper proposes that feelings, rather than cognitions or behaviours, are the 
core stuff of human experience and should provide the starting point for clinical 
understandings.  
  
So far in this special issue, we’ve suggested in various ways that cognition and it’s 
alternatives, narrative and discourse, are not primary in human experience. But 
what is?   
  
Feeling Bodies  
The moment by moment flow of our experience consists, before it consists of 
anything else, of a flow of embodied sensations or feelings. In neural terms, this is 
the fundamental fabric of consciousness: deprive the brain of all physical feedback 
from the body, and consciousness also disappears (Damasio, 1999). The body-brain 
system that enables consciousness provides it, whilst we are awake, with a constant 
flow of feelings from our viscera, muscles, joints, and skin. These get fluidly 
interwoven with other feelings, generated on the one hand as part of our emotional 
responses to stimuli, and on the other as elements of our memories for previous 
events.  
  
So feelings are not just emotions. They include emotions, but they also include a 
far wider class of experiences. Being hungry, thirsty or tired are feelings but not 
emotions, as are being gripped by sexual desire or pain. And there are other half-
recognised, inarticulate feelings, that arise fleetingly in social interaction and which 
lead us afterwards to say things like “well, it just felt wrong”. And although they 
are embodied experiences, feelings are nevertheless thoroughly socialised: 
evidence for this comes from neuroscience (Damasio, 1994); anthropology 
(Shweder, 2004); sociology and social theory (Bourdieu, 1977; Charlesworth, 
1999; Elias, 1978) ; and psychology (Benson, 2001; Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996; 
Ratner, 2000; Shotter, 1993).  
  
Feelings, then, are the core stuff of our psychological being. Because their source is 
twofold, their character and meaning bears two kinds of influence. On the one hand 
they are biological, generated from information gathered by the body-brain system 
to support the process of homeodynamics. And on the other they are enculturated, 
or socialised: they are the extra-verbal, non-pictorial, bodily component of 
elements of prior learning and of memory. Moreover, these two sources, the 
biological and the social, remain neither separate nor distinct. They interact 
sensitively and profoundly through the early years of infancy, when important brain 
systems and structures are still maturing and hormonal-physiological equilibriums 
are being established, and continue to do so throughout life (see Gerhardt, 2004).  
  
So to be a person is first and foremost to be a feeling body. The feelings that 
constitute subjectivity give us a constant, “automatic” sense of our bodies: we don’t 
have to decide whether the chair we sit in is comfortable, we just know. They bias 
us toward goals, depending on material influences such as bodily state (hunger 
biases us towards eating), elements of previous history (a situation that felt bad 
previously is one we might more readily avoid in the future), and broad patterns of 
socialisation (people tend to do the things that “feel right” for them, based upon 
acquired subcultural norms). Feelings also direct our attention, making some 
objects appear more pertinent and others recede into the background.  
  
Because social and material feelings primordially constitute experience, their 
influence is continuous. Even when we imagine that we are simply being ‘rational’, 
the very form of our rationality will, in all probability, [p.14] be one that feels 
appropriate to the current situation (and if not, we will be uncomfortably aware of 
this). Feelings are not cognitive, in the usual sense of that word: they are not simply 
information about body and self that enters some kind of decision making model. 
Rather, feelings are the pre-cognitive, unreflective ground upon which information 
processing, ‘rational’ choosing and decision making occur. It is not that feelings 
cannot be taken as information: we can, for example, recognise that we feel tired 
and make deliberate efforts to compensate. But whether we recognise their 
influence or not, feelings are always present: shaping our goals, biasing our 
evaluations, and guiding our attention.  
  
Feelings, language and inner speech  
Many will be surprised by this analysis since it is often assumed that language, in 
the form of inner speech, is the primary element of subjective experience. 
Vygotsky (1962) is often credited with being the first to theorise this, showing how 
the contents of inner speech are acquired in social interaction. Things said to us 
during these interactions are first rehearsed aloud (outer or “egocentric” speech, as 
Piaget called it) before later being spoken wordlessly as inner speech. The claim 
that socialised, embodied feelings constitute the core of subjectivity is not a denial 
of the experience of inner speech. The point is that inner speech typically comes 
afterwards, and is not the primary force shaping our activity.  
  
Evidence for the secondary role of inner speech is suggested by work with split-
brain patients (Gazzaniga et al., 1996); by studies of people with anasognosia 
(where impairment consequent upon brain injuries is not recognised or even 
denied) (Damasio, 1999), and by other, rarer neurological conditions. Drawing on 
this and other evidence (including extensive experimental findings), renegade 
cognitive psychologists like Zajonc have also argued for versions of affective 
primacy, as have most psychodynamic theorists. A similar conclusion may be 
suggested by empirical studies of discourse which show that what people say is 
situated and occasioned in orientation to their current social situation, rather than 
being the simple expression of an “inner” decision-making process (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). Such evidence suggests that there is a kind of primacy to feelings, 
and that inner speech functions to make sense of them, relate them to things that are 
going on: to fix them, if you will, such that we can represent them to ourselves and 
know, in a thoroughly human sense, what our feelings mean. Through inner speech 
we make sense of our feelings, and because what we tend to remember of situations 
is the sense we made of them inner speech can appear primary. But the appearance 
is illusory: as Vygotsky himself theorised, inner speech functions to complete 
feelings, which always come first. This does not mean that inner speech has no 
influence, since clearly it does. We can, indeed, consciously choose to do one thing 
rather than another: not to have that extra cream cake, for example. But when inner 
speech guides our actions in these ways it does so by calling out further, alternate 
states of feeling. Indeed, the everyday phrase we use to reference such moments – 
“talk ourselves into…” – already suggests the secondary role that language 
typically has.  
  
So things that happen evoke feelings, which we name with inner speech. This inner 
speech can call out more feelings, which in turn may incite further commentary or 
reflection. There is a constant iteration between socialised feelings and socially-
derived inner speech, a dialectical relationship, a ceaseless flux of fluid movement 
from one to the other. But because language is representational in ways that 
feelings are not, our introspection and memories tend to emphasise the words that 
became relevant to our state of being rather than the nameless feelings that 
preceded them. Words (our own, or other people’s) can call out states of feeling, 
and they can to some extent guide or channel feelings we already have so that we 
act upon them, or relate to them, in one way rather than another - and again, when 
it fulfils this role we easily imagine that language made us do what we did. In these 
ways language and inner speech are hugely significant in our experience of being a 
person, [p.15] so significant that they can appear primary in our experience. But the 
real primacy lies with feelings.  
  
Making it up as we go along?  
At least since Spinoza, thinkers have recognised that feelings resist conscious 
efforts to change them. Since one of their key functions is to imbue subjectivity 
with a character appropriate to the material and social conditions we occupy, this 
may not be surprising. Feelings are how our primordial being-in-the-world is 
disclosed: both as habitual embodied intentional stances (which psychologists 
usually refer to using such constructs as “beliefs”), and also momentarily, in the 
here-and-now, in our immediate, pre-cognitive responses to things that happen, the 
events that occur and the situations we encounter.  
  
However, this is not to say that socialised feelings simply and unproblematically 
locate us in our worlds, since our fully human sense of our selves only emerges 
from their dialectical interaction with language (relationally, and as inner speech). 
But the fundamentally non-verbal character of feelings problematises their direct 
translation into words; moreover, the actual sources of our feelings are sometimes 
mysterious to us. So although feelings influence the trajectory of inner speech they 
do not wholly determine it. For example, if we fail to notice or recognise what 
prompted a particular feeling, our interpretation of it may be incorrect. Moreover, 
we often have good reason to disavow our feelings: to keep us going to a job we 
dislike, to avoid hurt to someone we care for, to protect ourselves against 
understandings too difficult or painful to contemplate. In these ways inner speech 
imbues our experience with a realm of ideality that can be both protective and 
harmful. In some situations, too, feelings may be mixed, vacillating or confused, 
further problematising their interpretation. Scheff (2003) proposes that the mixture 
of fear and shame is especially toxic, for example, and possibly productive not only 
of erroneous interpretations but also of aggressive or even violent behaviour.  
  
As a result, the view from the fleeting point of “rational” reflection that is “I” is 
always somewhat limited. Introspection is in any case not a natural ability, but 
rather a mode of culturally plausible commentary on the reasons for our own 
behaviour that, like other metacognitive abilities, we develop through interaction 
with others (King-Spooner, 1990). Compounding this, there are often too many 
influences making up our present for us to be cognisant of them all without getting 
hopelessly lost in reflection. Moreover, much of what we feel is driven by 
immediate situational, environmental or social structural factors, or subtended by 
neural mechanisms that operate outside of conscious awareness. The sources of 
other feelings are chronologically distant, or otherwise hard to identify – for 
example because it is in our immediate interest to ignore them, or because they are 
the outcome of social forces that remain mysterious to most of us (Smail, 2005).  
  
Consequently, we are in important ways making it up as we go along. We are, in 
fact, making our selves up as we go along, spinning out narrative constructions to 
fix our experiences, to render them coherent, sensible, morally acceptable, and 
rationally accountable to ourselves and others, according to prevailing subcultural 
norms. Nevertheless, our selves are not just socially constructed in discourse.  They 
are socially co-constituted -  in language and discourse, to be sure, but also, and 
much more fundamentally, in the embodied, material, socially situated flow of our 
being in the world. In this way, we are being made up by the experiences our 
narratives strive to fix, and this making up is more important and powerful than the 
retrospective ordering that mere narrative provides.  
  
Inevitably, then, selfhood is a somewhat fragile achievement. Those whose early 
parenting was insufficient to protect them from the hardships they encountered 
already know this, to the very core of their being. Where parenting is more 
adequate, however, and where the acquired internal dynamic (of feeling and inner 
speech) continues to resonate in broad consonance with the social and material 
conditions that shaped it, the [p.16] self may garner the illusion of solidity and 
permanence. But when power causes social and material conditions to change, and 
particularly when those changes are sudden, large and uncontrolled, this apparent 
stability may be revealed for the sensitive interdependence it actually is. In such 
ways, states of distress are produced.  
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